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The pricing of accruals quality in credit default swap spreads 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the association between accounting information risk, measured with accruals quality 
(AQ), and credit spreads, primarily measured with credit default swap (CDS) spreads. 
Theoretically, AQ measures the precision with which accruals map into cash flows. Better AQ 
implies a more-precise estimate of future cash flows, and, we predict, a reduction in credit spreads 
due to resulting lower uncertainty regarding the ability to meet debt interest and principal 
payments. In support of this hypothesis, we find a negative relationship between AQ and CDS 
spreads whereby better AQ is associated with lower CDS spreads. Additionally, we investigate the 
components of total AQ and find that innate AQ is more strongly associated with CDS spreads 
than is discretionary AQ. We further show that AQ moderates the market’s pricing of earnings: 
the relationship between earnings and CDS spreads weakens as AQ worsens. Together, our results 
indicate that accounting information risk is priced in credit spreads and that the CDS market 
responds not only to the level of earnings, but the quality thereof as well.  
 
Keywords:  CDS spreads, information risk, accruals quality, innate accruals, discretionary 
accruals. 
 
Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources. 
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The pricing of accruals quality in credit default swap spreads 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Accounting information precision and transparency are recognized as important 
determinants of credit spreads (e.g., Duffie and Lando, 2001; Yu, 2005). However, empirical 
research on the association between accounting information risk and credit spreads is limited. We 
define information risk, following Francis et al. (2005), as the likelihood that firm-specific 
information “pertinent to investor pricing decisions is of poor quality,” (p. 296) where the standard 
Bayesian measure of quality is the degree of information precision (e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 2004; 
Hautsch and Hess, 2007; Bhattacharya et al., 2012).1 Previous studies investigating the association 
of information risk and credit spreads have generally followed an analytical approach (e.g., Duffie 
and Lando, 2001), the utilization of subjective transparency scores, (e.g., Yu, 2005), or rough 
measures of credit risk (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Jorion et al., 2009). In this paper we investigate 
the relationship between information risk in earnings, measured with accruals quality (AQ) 
(Francis et al., 2005; Bhattacharya et al., 2012), and credit spreads, primarily measured with CDS 
spreads, a direct credit risk measure (Longstaff et al., 2005).    
Accruals serve as an important piece of accounting information and have value to market 
participants (Collins et al., 2003; Battalio et al., 2012).2 We define accruals quality as the degree 
to which accruals consistently map into cash flows (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; McNichols, 2002; 
                                                     
1 Analytical models utilizing a Bayesian learning approach to information acquisition typically measure information 
quality as relative information precision (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1991).  
2 Though the accounting literature also finds that accruals are sometimes difficult to identify and price (e.g., Sloan, 
1996; Xie, 2001; Dopuch et al., 2010), the informed participants in the CDS market are likely to do so better than 
unsophisticated investors (Collins et al., 2003). 
 2  
 
Francis et al., 2005). Our definition of accruals quality thus fits within the broader context of 
information risk; namely, the risk that implied cash flow information is of low precision 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2012). Accruals which do not translate into cash flows in a consistent, 
predictable way are by definition an imprecise measure of past, current, and future cash flows.3 If 
accruals do not map consistently into cash flows, reported accruals are considered to be low 
quality, implying a higher level of information risk. Accruals may not perfectly correlate with cash 
flows for a variety of reasons including accounting policy choices,4 errors in estimates, and 
managerial discretion and manipulation.  
We primarily measure credit spreads with CDS spreads. A CDS contract affords protection 
to a holder of a firm’s debt in the event of nonpayment or other pre-specified credit event. These 
contracts allow creditors to hedge exposure to debt from an issuing firm. While the CDS market 
sometimes receives negative press for its relation to the financial crisis of 2008-2009, it is 
important to debt market participants.5 Research suggests that CDS contracts improve capital 
allocation and reduce firms’ cost of capital (Stulz, 2010). CDS contracts also allow debt issuers to 
maintain higher leverage ratios and longer maturities, thereby increasing debt market efficiency 
(Saretto and Tookes, 2013).   
                                                     
3 We note that an alternative interpretation of accruals quality, in the spirit of Yu (2005), is that of accounting 
transparency. Higher-quality accruals can be defined as more transparent reporting, and in their discussion of Francis 
et al. (2005), Barth and Schipper (2008) interpret AQ as such. In addition, Duffie and Lando (2001) variously refer to 
“precision” and “transparency” levels when elaborating their theory of the impact of imperfect accounting reports on 
credit and credit default swap spreads. We interpret AQ as “information risk” since it best fits the construct so defined 
by Francis et al.  (2005). 
4 An example of an accounting policy choice that may impact accruals quality is the decision of whether to use a First-
in-first-out (FIFO) inventory costing system or Last-in-first-out (LIFO) system. Krishnan et al.  (2008) analytically 
and empirically show that accruals quality is significantly worse for FIFO than LIFO firms.   
5 See, for example, Lanchester, J. (June 1, 2009). Outsmarted: High Finance vs. Human Nature. The New Yorker. 
85(16) pg. 83 and Could A.I.G Happen Again? (December 24, 2012). The New York Times. Editorial. A20.  
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Empirical evidence regarding an association between accruals quality and firm credit risk 
is limited.6 Jorion et al. (2009) explore the relationship between accruals quality and credit ratings, 
but credit ratings are themselves a weak measure of credit risk in that they tend to be sticky and 
backward-looking (Jiang, 2008). Another market setting to examine this association is that for 
publicly-traded debt. Analyses of accruals quality and bond yields generally find a tenuous 
relationship at best – and often no association at all (e.g., Lu et al., 2010). This may be at least 
partially attributed to the idiosyncrasies of bond issues (such as covenants, options, coupon rates, 
prevailing interest rates, etc.) and that investment grade corporate bond spreads only weakly 
measure credit risk (Lin et al., 2011a; Huang and Huang, 2012). Francis et al. (2005) find an 
association between accruals quality and a higher cost of debt, measured by the ratio of interest 
expense to interest-bearing debt; but given the plethora of characteristics which can impact interest 
rates paid on debt (e.g., form of debt, degree of collateralization, etc.), this is at best only an 
approximate measure of credit spreads. Further, the ratio of interest expense to debt is an 
accounting measure, not a direct market-based measure of credit risk.  
The CDS market offers a way around these limitations and represents a comparatively 
purer measure, independent of prevailing interest rates, unique bond and loan characteristics, and 
accounting conventions. Studies in the finance literature also find that the CDS market 
incorporates information more quickly than the bond market (Kwan, 1996; Longstaff et al., 2005; 
                                                     
6 While the literature is more extensive, the question as to whether accruals quality is a priced risk factor in equity 
markets is still unsettled. Francis et al. (2005), Krishnan et al. (2008), and Gray et al. (2009) provide evidence that 
accruals quality is priced by the market as information risk, while Core et al. (2008) fail to find that accruals quality 
is a priced risk factor. Kim and Qi (2010) and Ogneva (2012) replicate Core et al.’s (2008) result but also show 
accruals quality is priced after controlling for low-priced stocks and macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow shocks, 
respectively. See Shevlin (2013) for an in-depth discussion of the topic.  
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Zhu, 2006; Acharya and Johnson, 2007).7 Thus, we believe the CDS market is a preferable setting 
in which to test the effect of accounting information risk on firm credit spreads.8  
Accruals quality impacts the degree to which market participants can easily discern the true 
economic health of a firm. Since the underlying cash flow information in earnings with poor 
quality accruals is not easy to assess (i.e., accruals map into cash flows with only a low degree of 
precision), parties exposed to credit risk are likely to require compensation for this uncertainty in 
the form of a higher risk premium. We accordingly hypothesize that higher information risk will 
lead to an increase in credit spreads. We further hypothesize that innate accruals quality is more 
strongly related to credit spreads than discretionary accruals quality. Finally, in the context of an 
earnings quality measure, accruals quality denotes the precision with which earnings are expected 
to materialize as cash flows. Bayesian learning processes suggest, and we predict, that the 
relationship between earnings and credit spreads documented in earlier studies (e.g., Callen et al., 
2009) is moderated by accruals quality.  
 While failing to discern a robust association between accruals quality and credit spreads as 
proxied by excess bond yields, we find results consistent with our first hypothesis when 
operationalizing credit spreads as CDS spreads. After delineating accruals quality into its 
components, our results suggest that it is the quality of innate, rather than discretionary, accruals 
which has a more substantial impact on CDS prices. We employ fixed effects and changes 
regression models and find that our observed results are robust to endogeneity concerns resulting 
from time-invariant correlated omitted variables and that the CDS market responds to within-firm 
                                                     
7 Xiang et al. (2017) demonstrate profitable simulated equity trading strategies utilizing leading CDS information. 
8 “Preferable” does not imply “perfect,” however. Conclusions drawn from CDS data are limited by the fact that the 
sample employed is necessarily those for which traded CDS data exist (which may be different from all debt-issuers 
in general) and that CDS prices are a product of the market activity of a relatively small number of counter parties. 
Concentration in the CDS market is remarkable, with one study finding 73% of CDS sales attributable to the ten most 
active traders (Peltonen et al., 2013).     
 5  
 
changes in accruals quality. We further find evidence in support of our prediction that accruals 
quality moderates the CDS market’s relationship with earnings. The informativeness of earnings, 
in the form of return on assets, to the CDS market weakens as accruals quality declines. In 
additional analyses, we show that our results hold during the global financial crisis, for firms with 
various credit ratings, and across alternate CDS maturities. Further, our results are robust to 
controlling for operating characteristics as suggested by Liu and Wysocki (2007).  
 We contribute to multiple streams of literature. First, we find that accounting information 
risk is associated with higher credit spreads. Prior efforts to establish this relationship used only 
rough proxies for both accounting information risk and credit risk. The utilization of CDS spreads 
demonstrates a clear link between accounting information risk and firm credit risk. Second, we 
continue to show a significant effect of accruals quality after controlling for the standard deviation 
of returns and cash flows. Liu and Wysocki (2007) find accruals quality is no longer significant in 
explaining the cost of debt after controlling for these variables; that our results persist in their 
presence contributes to the literature regarding the robustness of the effect of accruals quality on 
debt markets. Finally, we demonstrate a moderating role of accruals quality in that there is a 
stronger association between CDS spreads and earnings when those earnings feature a lower level 
of information risk. This finding adds to the literature regarding the effects of information quality 
on markets’ information gathering and pricing processes. Consistent with prior studies in equity 
markets (e.g., Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988; Teoh and Wong, 1993; Burgstahler and Chuk, 
2010) and futures markets (Hautsch and Hess, 2007; Hautsch et al., 2012) we find that increased 
information precision leads to stronger pricing effects of that information.  
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains background information on the credit 
default swap market and a review of relevant literature. Section 3 details the hypothesis 
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development and models used. Section 4 presents data, descriptive statistics, and univariate results, 
while Section 5 provides primary (CDS market) regression results, additional analyses, and 
robustness tests. A summary and implications of findings, and suggestions for future research, are 
presented in Section 6.  
2. Background and literature review 
 
2.1. Background on the CDS market  
 
 Credit default swap contracts have grown in prominence in recent years, with a notional 
value outstanding of $11 trillion today.9 CDSs operate as insurance on the bonds of an issuing 
company. Typically, the protection buyer (the holder of the bond, or possibly another market 
participant betting against a company’s ability to repay its bond obligations) makes quarterly 
payments to the seller of the CDS contract. These payments are generally defined in terms of basis 
points. For example, a protection buyer for a firm with a CDS spread of 80 basis points makes 
quarterly payments of $20,000 on a $10 million bond issue (0.0080/4 x $10,000,000). If a pre-
specified credit event occurs (e.g., bankruptcy, failure to pay), the protection seller pays the 
protection buyer the face value of the bonds and the buyer delivers the bonds to the protection 
seller. If the buyer does not hold the bonds, a credit event results in a monetary payout of the 
difference between the current and face value of the bonds.  
 
2.2. Relevant literature 
Using CDS spreads to measure credit risk has multiple advantages over other methods, 
such as credit ratings or bond yields. First, credit ratings are notoriously sticky (e.g., Jiang, 2008; 
                                                     
9 Per International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), information as of 6-19-17. Retrieved from 
http://www.swapsinfo.org/charts/swaps/notional-outstanding. The notional value is a theoretical value on which 
interest payments are based and the par amount of credit protection in a CDS agreement. The notional amount of credit 
default swaps often exceeds the total amount of debt issued by a reference entity.  
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Callen et al., 2009). Credit rating agencies are typically slow to change a firm’s credit rating and 
ratings are relatively insensitive to specific pieces of new information. The upshot is that ratings 
are often a lagging indicator of credit risk.10, 11 Second, bond yields are largely driven by prevailing 
interest rates, including the risk-free rate, and are also a function of idiosyncratic bond features 
such as covenants and options; differences in coupon rates and tax considerations also affect bond 
values (Callen et al., 2009). This variety of potential arrangements and multiplicity of bond 
characteristics often makes it difficult in practice to discern the portion of bond yields directly 
attributable to credit risk, especially in cross-sectional studies. Huang and Huang (2012) find that 
only a small portion of investment grade corporate bond spreads measure credit risk; Lin et al. 
(2011a) similarly find less than half of bond spreads, on average, are attributable to default-related 
factors. The bond market also typically features limited trading activity relative to equity and CDS 
markets, hampering its ability to price new information (Blanco et al., 2005).  
 Research into the relationship between accounting information and CDS spreads is a 
relatively recent undertaking. Das et al. (2009) find that accounting information is relevant in the 
pricing of CDS contracts, and Chakravarty (2011) finds a negative relationship between CDS 
prices and various measures of conditional conservatism. In a cross-country study, Gallagher and 
McKillop (2010) find that unfunded pension liabilities result in higher CDS spreads. Additionally, 
Bhat et al.  (2016) note a decline in credit spreads following the adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). See Griffin (2014) for a full review of accounting treatment effects 
on the CDS market.  
                                                     
10 In an Australian sample, Wang et al. (2014) demonstrate that credit downgrades elicit very little response from the 
CDS market, although negative watch announcements generate a (relatively) stronger upward spread movement of 
about two basis points over a (-1, 1) window.   
11 However, to the extent that credit rating changes are designed to capture permanent, rather than transitory, changes 
in credit risk this stickiness is by design. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.   
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Prior literature finds accounting earnings to be useful in explaining credit risk. Callen et al.  
(2009), using levels, change, and event-study analyses, find a negative relation between earnings 
and the size of CDS spreads. In addition, they show both cash and accrual portions are significant 
in explaining spreads. The extent to which CDS prices efficiently impound earnings information 
appears conditional upon economic stability, however. While they find efficient pricing before and 
after the global financial crisis, Jenkins et al. (2016) show a significant post-earnings 
announcement drift during the 2007-2009 period, including initial under-reactions to both 
quarterly earnings surprises and accruals information.12 Relatedly, Batta et al. (2013) document a 
positive association between the speed of CDS price discovery after a firm’s earnings 
announcement and the availability of firm-level private information. Default probability models 
relying on earnings and other accounting variables are useful in predicting changes in CDS spreads 
as well (Correia et al., 2012).  
 While accounting accruals have information value (e.g., Dechow, 1994), they are the 
product of projections and estimates of future cash flows. The use of accrual accounting 
necessitates an inherent tradeoff between relevance and reliability. The decreased reliability of 
accruals is at a minimum a function of accounting conventions, implementation choices, and errors 
in estimates. However, managers may also manipulate accrual figures opportunistically, leading 
to another source of discrepancy between accrued income and eventual receipts of cash.13  
 To the best of our knowledge, no study directly links accounting information risk to credit 
spreads. Evidence regarding the association between accruals quality and debt interest rates is 
mixed. Graham et al.  (2008) find that following restatements, bank loans tend to have significantly 
                                                     
12 Interestingly, Shivakumar et al. (2011) find that the CDS market reactions to management forecast news are stronger 
than to actual earnings news. 
13 For example, managers may use positive discretionary accruals to opportunistically manage earnings prior to equity 
offerings (Teoh et al., 1998; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
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higher spreads, indicative of greater information risk present in financial statements in general and 
earnings in particular.14  
 Francis et al.  (2005) explicitly link accruals quality to the cost of debt, defined as the ratio 
of interest expense to interest-bearing outstanding debt. They find that accruals quality is 
negatively associated with the cost of debt, with innate accruals quality more strongly associated 
than discretionary accruals quality, suggesting that firms with poorer accruals quality experience 
higher debt costs. In a sample of Australian firms, Gray et al. (2009) also find that innate accruals 
quality is negatively related to a firm’s cost of debt. Yet other research contests the assertion that 
accruals quality is related to the historical cost of debt. For instance, Liu and Wysocki (2007) find 
that accruals quality is not associated with the cost of debt after controlling for the variation in 
residual returns and cash flows. Liu and Wysocki suggest accruals quality is merely associated 
with operating characteristics and does not drive a firm’s cost of capital through information risk.  
 
3. Hypotheses development and models 
 
3.1. Hypotheses development 
 
A wide literature demonstrates information risk is important to asset pricing (e.g., Easley 
et al., 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007; Epstein and Schneider, 2008; Lambert 
et al., 2012). Easley and O’Hara (2004), Lambert et al. (2007), and Lambert et al. (2012) provide 
analytical evidence supporting the expectation that imprecise information leads to higher costs of 
capital due to difficulties in pricing securities. Specifically, Lambert et al.  (2007) demonstrate that 
firm value increases in the level of accounting information precision. More precise accounting 
information reduces the expected variance of, and the corresponding price discount applied to, 
                                                     
14 Indeed, earnings feature prominently in most restatements in Graham et al. (2008). The authors find that in a large 
majority of restatement cases reported earnings are reduced, with nine earnings overstatements for each 
understatement in their sample. 
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expected cash flows. Greater precision with regards to expected cash flows in turn increases firm 
value and decreases the required return of holding its securities.   
Duffie and Lando (2001) extend the information precision literature to credit markets by 
analytically modelling credit spreads under perfect and imperfect information. In their models, less 
precise accounting information is associated with higher probabilities of default, credit spreads, 
and default swap spreads.  
  We measure the precision of accounting information with accruals quality. High-quality 
accruals, defined as those which translate predictably into cash flows, result in more precise 
expected cash flow figures which are easier for market participants to interpret. Low-quality 
accruals, bearing less on future cash flows, are more difficult to assess; as a result, the true 
economic health of a firm, and in particular its ability to make principal and interest payments on 
issued debt, is less easily discerned. Parties exposed to credit risk are likely to require 
compensation for this increased information risk in the form of higher spreads. Accordingly, our 
first hypothesis, in alternate form, is as follows: 
 
H1: Accruals quality is inversely related with credit spreads. 
 
 
 Accruals quality can be decomposed into innate (primarily resulting from accounting rules 
and a firm’s operating environment) and discretionary portions. Discretionary accruals may be a 
function of opportunistic reporting choices, error, and noise (all of which increase information 
risk), but also managerial efforts to improve the informativeness of earnings (which reduce the 
information risk present in accruals quality).15 To the extent information risk in discretionary 
                                                     
15 Jackson (2017) demonstrates that peer-firm behavior may also impact discretionary accrual estimations, reinforcing 
the notion that “discretionary” accruals do not necessarily correspond to managed earnings as is sometimes implied 
in the literature.  
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accruals is attenuated by contravening information risk-decreasing (informative) managerial 
reporting choices, the effect of discretionary accruals quality on credit risk is likely to be less than 
that of the innate portion. We hypothesize accordingly: 
 
H2: The effect of the innate portion of accruals quality on credit spreads is larger than that 
of the discretionary portion.  
 
Prior studies in equity markets (e.g., Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988; Teoh and Wong, 1993; 
Burgstahler and Chuk, 2010) and futures markets (Hautsch and Hess, 2007; Hautsch et al., 2012) 
document the impact of information quality on markets’ information gathering and pricing 
processes. These studies find that higher information quality results in stronger pricing effects. For 
instance, accounting information precision explains a significant portion of the behavior of 
earnings response coefficients (Burgstahler and Chuk, 2010), while U.S. Treasury bond prices are 
more sensitive to employment announcements of greater precision (Hautsch and Hess, 2007). 
Earnings, through the clean surplus relation, have a direct bearing on the future wealth and asset 
dynamics of the firm. Indeed, empirical evidence demonstrates the CDS market prices reported 
earnings (e.g., Callen et al., 2009), and we expect information risk in earnings to impact the CDS 
market as well. While the value of the cash portion of earnings for investors is relatively certain, 
that of the accrual portion is less so. As we interpret accruals quality as a measure of the 
informational content of earnings, we hypothesize the responsiveness of the credit markets to 
earnings information may be moderated by AQ. Specifically, if our hypothesis H1 is correct in that 
a lower level of accruals quality is associated with higher credit spreads, then the established 
negative relationship between the level of earnings and credit spreads in prior work (e.g., Callen 
et al. , 2009) should be weaker for firms with poor accruals quality. Formally: 
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H3: Accruals quality moderates the negative relationship between earnings and credit 
spreads. 
  
3.2. Models 
 Following McNichols (2002), Francis et al.  (2005), and Krishnan et al.  (2008) our primary 
measure of accruals quality to test hypothesis H1 is the standard deviation of the residual of the 
following regression equation, estimated cross-sectionally each year: 
TCAj,t = β0 + β1CFOj,t-1 + β2CFOj,t + β3CFOj,t+1 + β4ΔRevj,t + β5PPEj,t + νj,t        (1) 
 
TCA represents total current accruals for firm j in period t. TCA is defined as ΔCAj,t – ΔCLj,t 
– ΔCashj,t + ΔSTDEBTj,t in year t. CFO is cash flow from operations and is defined as NIBEj,t – 
TAj,t. NIBE is net income before extraordinary items. TA is total accruals = ΔCAj,t – ΔCLj,t - ΔCashj,t 
+ ΔSTDEBTj,t – DEPNj,t. ΔCA is change in current assets between years t-1 and t, ΔCL is change 
in current liabilities between years t-1 and t, ΔCash is change in cash between years t-1 and t, 
ΔSTDEBT is change in short-term debt between years t-1 and t, DEPN is depreciation and 
amortization expense in year t, ΔRev is change in revenues between years t-1 and t, and PPE is the 
gross value of property, plant, and equipment. We scale all regressors by average total assets. 
Accruals quality, AQ, is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from Equation (1), σ(νj), 
over years t-4 through year t, and a larger value of AQ represents worse accruals quality for a given 
firm-year. Thus, it is the dispersion of unexplained accruals, rather than the magnitude, that 
determines accruals quality.16 Even large abnormal accruals (residuals) which exhibit low 
variation should at least be predictable and therefore not a source of information risk priced into 
                                                     
16 In accordance with our definition of information risk, it is the precision of the mapping of accruals to cash flows 
which is most important in our analysis, not the accuracy with which accruals reflect past, current, and future cash 
flows. To expand, if realized cash flows represent only a portion (less than 100%) of accruals, one would judge that 
accruals do not accurately correspond to cash flows. However, if that portion is consistent over time (indicating low 
variation in the percentage of realized cash flows), one would still conclude that accruals precisely represented cash 
flows (or rather a constant multiple thereof) and therefore represent high-quality accruals.  
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CDS spreads (Francis et al., 2005). We alternatively measure AQ as the decile rank of accruals 
quality (RANK_AQ).   
The credit spread model we use is similar to that of Callen et al. (2009). The primary 
independent variable of interest is accruals quality, AQ.  
CSj,t = γ0 + γ1AQj,t + γ2ROAj,t  + γ3LEVj,t + γ4SD_RETj,t + γ5SPOTt + γ6SIZEj,t + γ7IRj,t + μj,t 
                                            (2) 
 
CS is the credit spread for firm j in period t. AQ is accruals quality as previously defined, 
ROA is net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets, and LEV is the ratio 
of total debt to total assets; we obtain these data from Compustat. SD_RET is the standard deviation 
of monthly returns during the firm’s current fiscal year from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). SPOT is the one year Treasury bill rate accessed from the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data website.17 SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity, and IR is the 
implied credit rating as provided by Markit18 for firm j and year t.19 We expect a positive 
coefficient on AQ: worse accruals quality (as indicated by a larger standard deviation of the 
residual from Equation [1]) should be associated with higher credit spreads. Taking into account 
the findings of Callen et al.  (2009), we control for ROA and expect it to have a negative coefficient. 
We predict leverage and the standard deviation of stock returns will be positively associated with 
CDS as they indicate levels of business risk. We expect negative coefficients on SPOT, as a higher 
risk-free rate of interest increases firm wealth (Callen et al., 2009); SIZE, because larger firms tend 
to have lower levels of information asymmetry (e.g., Grant, 1980; Collins et al., 1987); and IR, 
because better credit ratings indicate lower credit risk.    
                                                     
17 Data available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.  
18 Now IHS Markit (from 2016). 
19 We code implied credit ratings on a scale of 1 to 10, with higher numbers reflecting greater creditworthiness.  
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We test Hypothesis 2 using a third equation. This equation allows for the delineation of 
innate and discretionary accruals quality components (Francis et al., 2005): 
AQj,t = λ0 + λ1ATj,t +  λ2σ(CFO)j,t + λ3σ(Sales)j,t + λ4OperCyclej,t + λ5NegEarnj,t + εj,t        (3)   
  
The predicted value from Equation (3) represents the innate portion of accruals quality, 
INNATE. The residual, ε, represents the discretionary portion of AQ, DISCRET. AT represents the 
log of total assets, σ(CFO) is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations over period t-9 
through t, σ(Sales) is the standard deviation of sales over the period t-9 through t, OperCycle is the 
log of the sum of days’ inventory and days’ accounts receivable, and NegEarn is the number of 
years out of the past ten that a firm reported NIBE < 0. To test the impact of both innate and 
discretionary accruals quality on credit spreads, we estimate the following model: 
 CSj,t = γ0 + γ1INNATEj,t + γ2DISCRETj,t  + γ3ROAj,t + γ4LEVt + γ5SD_RETj,t + γ6SPOTt + 
γ7SIZEj,t + γ8IRj,t + μj,t                                (4) 
 
We expect positive coefficients on both INNATE and DISCRET, but predict the magnitude of γ1 
will exceed that of γ2. We test Hypothesis 3 using a model similar to that of Equation (2).   
CSj,t = γ0 + γ1ROAj,t + γ2Zj,t + γ3ROA x Zj,t + γ4LEVj,t + γ5SD_RETt + γ6SPOTt + γ7SIZEj,t + 
γ8IRj,t + μj,t                                                     (5a-b) 
 
The variable Z represents the continuous variable AQ in model 5a and POOR_AQ (a dichotomous 
operationalization taking a value of 1 if an observation has a value of AQ that is among the poorest 
10 percent of all observations and a value of 0 otherwise) in model 5b. All other variables are as 
previously defined. We predict a positive and significant γ3 in support of H3.20   
 
 
                                                     
20 We expect γ3 to be positive as the expected main effect of ROA on CS is negative. If credit markets respond less to 
earnings when accruals are of lower quality (higher numerical values of AQ), then the interaction term should be 
positively associated with CS.  
 15  
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1. Data 
Our primary measure of CS is CDS spreads, CDS. We obtain CDS data from the Markit 
Group, which provides composite CDS spreads based on the daily closing bid and ask prices 
obtained from market makers. Similar to Zhang et al. (2009) and Shivakumar et al. (2011), we use 
CDS data for contracts with a five-year maturity in our primary analyses on senior debt issues with 
modified restructuring clauses. Our sample consists of 7,491,284 daily observations for 1,409 
firms, after excluding those in the financial industry. We manually match CDS spread data with 
Compustat and CRSP data. For each firm-year, we calculate the average daily CDS spread for the 
month that is three months after the annual earnings per share announcement date.21 For example, 
if a firm reports earnings during the month of February, we average the CDS spreads reported by 
Markit for the month of May and take the natural log of that number. This treatment is similar to 
that of Francis et al. (2007) who create hedged portfolios based on accruals quality three months 
after an earnings announcement. From an initial 5,437 firm-year observations with both Compustat 
and CDS data we remove observations with insufficient data to compute accruals quality. The 
procedure results in a sample size of 4,016 firm-years (see Table 1), representing 561 firms over 
the period 2001 – 2013. When we exclude firms without short-term credit ratings in additional 
analyses, we obtain a sample size of 2,028 firm-years (for 303 firms). As can be seen in Table 1, 
our sample size per year increases until the financial crisis and declines slightly thereafter.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 
                                                     
21 We obtain earnings announcement dates from Compustat.  
 16  
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows that the firms in our sample tend to be large (with a mean market 
capitalization, raw size, of $20.5 billion) and profitable (with a mean ROA of 4.7 percent). Firms 
in our sample tend to be highly leveraged, with an average total debt-to-assets ratio of 0.65. The 
mean one-year Treasury bill rate (SPOT) over the sample period is 1.93 percent. Implied credit 
ratings (IR) of firms in the sample (provided by Markit) range from “AAA” (equivalent to a ten) 
to “D” (equivalent to a one), and the firms in our sample are largely creditworthy. Specifically, 
they have an average implied credit rating of 6.955, equivalent to roughly a “BBB” rating. 
Concerning our primary variables of interest, the mean (median) raw CDS spread is 187.6 (88) 
basis points. The mean (median) bond spread (the difference between the bond yield and the yield 
of a comparable maturity Treasury bond) is 2.311% (1.713%). The mean value of AQ is 0.027.22 
Consistent with prior studies, the innate component of accruals quality in our study (median value 
of 0.026) is much greater than the discretionary portion (median value of -0.003).  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.3. Analysis of accruals quality and excess bond yields 
Prior to examining the association between AQ and CDS spreads, we first analyze the 
extent to which accruals quality is reflected in excess bond yields. Strong results between AQ and 
excess bond yields would directly indicate bond market participants price earnings quality. Yet a 
review of prior literature is inconclusive. Lu et al. (2010), for instance, find only limited support 
for the notion that bond yields reflect accruals quality; only in some model specifications and 
                                                     
22 Our value is similar to, though slightly smaller than, the mean value of AQ computed by Francis et al. (2005) of 
0.044. However, the average firm in our sample is larger than that in their study (mean value of total assets of $20.3 
billion, untabulated, versus $1.3 billion) and on average larger firms have better accruals quality (Francis et al., 2005; 
Core et al., 2008). Our mean value is also similar to the reported mean AQ value of 0.034 for LIFO firms, which also 
tend to be large (Krishnan et al., 2008). 
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subsamples is a statistically significant relationship observed. Given a lack of convincing evidence 
in prior literature, we estimate a form of Equation (2) whereby we operationalize CS as excess 
bond yields (EX_YIELD) and regress on AQ and the set of control variables in Equation (2). The 
dependent variable is calculated as the average excess bond yield (across issuances) three months 
after the reporting date (in line with the calculation of our primary dependent variable, CDS 
spreads). Excess bond yields are calculated as the residuals obtained by regressing bond spreads 
on rating, duration, maturity, issuing size, and coupon rates (Lin et al., 2011b). Bond price and 
characteristic data are from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) and Mergent’s 
Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD) respectively.23 Our initial bond sample includes all 
bonds (including straight, puttable, callable, convertible, etc.)24 for the 2000 – 2013 period;  after 
calculating excess yields, we merge with our dataset for which CDS data is also available. We 
estimate the model using OLS regressions with firm-clustered standard errors, and include year 
fixed effects in all regressions. All stated p-values are two-tailed. 
Results indicate AQ is only weakly associated with excess bond yields. Operationalizing 
AQ in its continuous form, we fail to find a significant association between AQ and excess bond 
yields at conventional levels (p = 0.14). We alternatively measure AQ as the decile-rank form of 
the measure, and find that RANK_AQ is marginally significant (p = 0.09) and positively associated 
with EX_YIELD. However, when splitting AQ into its innate or discretionary components, we 
again fail to find significant results (p = 0.57 and 0.15, respectively). In line with prior literature, 
therefore, we also find only a tenuous relationship between AQ and credit risk as measured by 
bond yields. This is perhaps not surprising given the preceding discussion on the idiosyncratic 
nature of bond contracts and prior literature (e.g., Lu et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2011a; Huang and 
                                                     
23 We follow Bessembinder et al. (2009) to clean the data from TRACE. 
24 Results are similar, if weaker, for a subsample utilizing only straight bonds.  
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Huang, 2012). To further analyze our research question regarding the association of AQ and credit 
risk, we thus turn to perhaps a better source of credit risk information, the CDS market. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 4.4. Univariate analysis of accruals quality and CDS spreads 
Table 4 provides a correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables. A 
review of the table indicates that CDS is positively and significantly correlated with AQ, providing 
initial evidence in favor of H1 (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.219, p < 0.01). As expected, 
ROA is strongly and negatively associated with CDS (Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.451, p 
< 0.01). LEV and SD_RET are positively correlated with the dependent variable at the one percent 
significance level, while SPOT, SIZE, and IR are negatively related at the one percent level. These 
correlations are of the expected signs. An analysis of the correlations between independent 
variables indicates they are low. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Further evidence in favor of H1 is found in Figure 1, which reports the mean CDS spread 
(in basis points) by accruals quality quintile. The mean CDS spread for the highest-quality AQ 
quintile is 116 basis points and increases monotonically by quintile; the mean CDS spread for the 
poorest-quality quintile is 270, resulting in a difference between the first and fifth quintiles of 154 
basis points. This difference is statistically significant (t-statistic = -7.31, p < 0.01), and provides 
further univariate evidence in favor of our first hypothesis.25, 26  
                                                     
25 The differences between the first and third (t-statistic = 1.77, p < 0.10) and third and fifth quintiles (t-statistic = 
5.28, p < 0.01) are also significant.  
26 Francis et al. (2005) report a cost of debt of 8.98 percent and 10.77 percent for the best and worst AQ quintiles, 
respectively, for a difference of 179 basis points (18.1% relative to mean). Kim and Qi (2010) report a best-quintile 
cost of debt of 9.15 percent (average of first and second reported AQ deciles) and a worst-quintile cost of debt of 
13.90 percent (average of ninth and tenth reported AQ deciles), for a difference of 475 basis points (42.4% relative to 
mean). In relative terms, the change in CDS spreads between the first and fifth AQ quintiles is larger (82.1% relative 
to mean); this larger observed difference may be due to the fact that the CDS market represents a relatively purer 
measure of credit risk.   
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
5. Multivariate analysis and robustness tests 
5.1. Regression results 
We present the results of estimating the regression model in Equation (2) to formally test 
hypothesis H1 in Table 5. We estimate this model using OLS regressions with firm-clustered 
standard errors, and include year fixed effects in all regressions. All stated p-values are two-tailed. 
In Column A, consistent with Callen et al.  (2009), we find an association of higher earnings with 
lower CDS spreads; the estimated coefficient on earnings scaled by average total assets (ROA) is 
negative (-1.873) and significant (p < 0.01). Concerning our independent variable of interest, AQ, 
the estimated coefficient is positive (3.114) and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that poorer 
accruals quality is associated with larger CDS spreads in support of hypothesis H1. This result 
appears economically significant as well: a one-standard deviation improvement (deterioration) in 
AQ is associated with a seven percent reduction (increase) in CDS spreads ([e0.021 x 3.114-1] x 100). 
All control variables are significant in the expected direction. The coefficients on firm leverage 
and the standard deviation of returns are positive and significant (p < 0.01). Firm size, the one-
year Treasury bill rate (SPOT), and the implied credit rating are negative and significantly related 
to CDS spreads at the one percent level.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
To get a further sense of the economic importance of accruals quality, we re-estimate 
Equation (2) using the decile-rank form of accruals quality, with higher deciles corresponding to 
poorer accruals quality. Results, tabulated in Column B of Table 5, indicate that the estimated 
coefficient on the decile-rank form of AQ, RANK_AQ, is positive (0.024) and significant at the one 
percent level. Each decile improvement in accruals quality (represented by consecutively lower 
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numerical values of RANK_AQ) is associated with a CDS spread that is lower by approximately 
2.4 percentage points ([e0.024-1] x 100). This indicates an improvement of AQ from the highest to 
lowest decile is associated with a reduction in CDS spreads of approximately 22 percent (2.4 x 9), 
or 41 basis points at the raw mean (0.024 x 9 x 187.6).27  
Accruals quality is split into innate and discretionary components in the regression model 
of Equation (4), presented in Column C of Table 5. While the estimated coefficient on INNATE 
(10.523) is positive and significant (p < 0.01), the estimated coefficient on DISCRET (1.277) is 
not significant at conventional levels (p = 0.17). We thus find support for our second hypothesis: 
the effect of the innate portion of accruals quality is stronger than that of the discretionary 
portion.28  The signs and significance levels of the remaining control variables are similar to that 
of the previous models. Thus, in contrast to the weak results observed between AQ and excess 
bond yields, we find a persistent, strong association between AQ and CDS spreads.  
We estimate a fixed effects specification of Equation (2) to test the robustness of our 
findings regarding the association between accruals quality and CDS spreads. Fixed effects 
estimation controls for potentially-confounding, time-invariant correlated omitted variables. It 
estimates the effect of a change in the independent variables on the change observed in the 
dependent variable, relative to the average level of these variables for each firm (Wooldridge, 
                                                     
27 These findings are also similar to Francis et al.’s (2005) multivariate results. They report a change between the 
lowest and highest-quality AQ deciles of 126 basis points (13% relative to the reported average). While this number 
is slightly smaller than ours (22%), we note its similar magnitude. Again, our findings of a (slightly) larger impact of 
AQ in the CDS market is likely attributable to the fact that the CDS market represents a relatively purer measure of 
credit risk whereby the theorized relationship between accounting quality and credit risk is more clearly evident. 
28 These findings are consistent with Dichev et al. (2013) who report, based on a survey that nearly seventy-five 
percent of chief financial officers believe that the most important factor affecting earnings quality is the firm’s business 
model reflected in the innate component of accruals. Additionally, our findings align with prior studies on the behavior 
of equity investors. DeFond and Park (2001) and Bowen et al., (2008) find that investors rely less on discretionary 
accruals than on innate accruals in making investment decisions.   
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2011, p. 301). As such fixed effects models require variation in variables of interest over time to 
identify parameters. 
Results are tabulated in Panel A of Table 6. Using the model in Equation (2) with fixed 
effects, the estimated coefficient on AQ is again positive and significant (4.168, p < 0.01). The 
remaining control variables are significant as in prior models.29 Panel B of Table 6 presents results 
from a changes version of Equation (2). We compute our change variables by calculating the year-
over-year difference for each variable used in the model. The estimation of the changes model also 
reveals that the estimated coefficient on ΔAQ is positive and significant at the one percent level.30 
These results demonstrate the CDS market responds to changes in accruals quality, as well as a 
robustness of our results to time-invariant correlated omitted variables, easing concerns of 
endogeneity-induced bias in the base level results. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We next report the results of our tests of hypothesis H3. Thus far we have treated accruals 
quality as a distinct construct independent from the level of ROA. In other words, we have 
separately examined the differential effects of accruals quality and firm performance. However, in 
light of the findings regarding our hypothesis H1, that a lower level of accruals quality is associated 
with higher CDS spreads, we predict the established negative relationship between the level of 
earnings and CDS spreads (in Tables 4  ̶  6 and prior work, e.g., Callen et al. [2009]) should be 
attenuated for firms with poor accruals quality.  
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
                                                     
29 For completeness, we re-estimate the remaining models in Table 4 using a firm fixed-effects specification as well. 
Our variables of interest continue to be significant at the same significance levels, with the exception of DISCRET, 
which is significant at the one percent level in fixed effects estimation. A Wald test however indicates the estimated 
coefficient on INNATE continues to be larger than that on DISCRET at the one percent level in support of H2.  
30 We alternatively operationalize the changes version of Equation (2) without year fixed effects. Results are 
unaffected by this specification; we continue to find a positive and significant (p < 0.01) coefficient on ΔAQ 
(untabulated).    
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 Column A of Table 7 indicates, as in previous tables, a negative coefficient on ROA and a 
positive coefficient on AQ, significant at the one and five percent levels respectively. Importantly, 
and in support of H3, the coefficient on ROA x AQ is positive and significant at the one percent 
level; the reduction in CDS spreads brought about by a higher ROA is limited for firms with poor 
accruals quality. To obtain a better sense of the magnitude of this reduction, we next replace the 
continuous AQ variable with a “poor AQ” dichotomous variable. Results in Column B show that 
the relationship between ROA and CDS continues to be negative and significant, as expected 
(coefficient estimate = -2.154, p < 0.01). The estimated coefficient on our variable of interest, ROA 
x POOR_AQ, is positive and significant (1.342, p < 0.01). A partial F-test of the coefficients on 
ROA and ROA x POOR_AQ indicates that that while the sum of the two is still less than and 
statistically different from zero, the effect of a larger ROA on CDS spreads is reduced by more 
than half for firms with poor accruals quality. Alternatively, in untabulated analyses we define 
POOR_AQ as equal to one if a firm’s accruals quality is worse than the median observation and 
zero otherwise. We observe similar results partitioning along the median; namely ROA is negative 
and significant at the one percent level, while ROA x POOR_AQ remains positive and significant 
at the one percent level. Consistent with prior studies examining the impact of information 
precision in equity markets (e.g., Imhoff and Lobo, 1992) and futures markets (e.g., Hautsch and 
Hess, 2007), less precise earnings information leads to lower earnings informativeness in the CDS 
market. 
5.2. Additional analyses   
 We perform several additional analyses. First, we examine the impact of the global 
financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 – 2009 on the relationship between accruals quality and CDS 
spreads. The expected effect of the GFC is uncertain ex ante – on the one hand investors demanding 
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protection from credit events may have become more sensitive to measures of information risk, 
while on the other if doubt arose as to the quality of all firms’ earnings, perhaps less emphasis on 
earnings and characteristics thereof occurred. We define the GFC period as between September 
2007 and June 2009. To test the impact of the GFC we create a dichotomous variable, GFC, and 
assign this variable a value of one for observations during the GFC, and zero otherwise. We then 
add this GFC dichotomous variable to our main regression model, along with an interaction term 
between AQ and GFC.  Results, tabulated in Column A of Table 8, provide some evidence that 
AQ was less strongly associated with CDS spreads during the financial crisis: the interaction term 
AQ x GFC bears a negative coefficient and is marginally significant (p < 0.10).   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
We next explore the impact of a firm’s credit rating on the observed relationship between 
CDS spreads and AQ. Following Callen et al. (2009), we define LOWRATED, a dichotomous 
variable that takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if an observation has a rating at or below BBB 
(based on S&P long-term ratings); this also effectively splits our sample along the mean credit 
rating value. Results, tabulated in Column B of Table 8, indicate that the relationship between AQ 
and CDS spreads is statistically the same in both low and high rated observations (AQ x 
LOWRATED coefficient estimate = -0.313, p = .86). 
We further analyze the impact of accounting restatements on CDS spreads, and test 
whether the presence of a restatement moderates the observed CDS-AQ relationship, in Column 
C of Table 8. We obtain restatement information for the 2000 – 2013 period from Audit Analytics. 
Requiring Audit Analytics data reduces our sample size from 4,016 to 3,757. Restatements affect 
a sizable proportion of our observations (11%), with more restatements occurring in the early 
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2000s, in line with prior literature, and relatively fewer restatements occurring in the later portion 
of our sample period.  
  To test the impact of restatements on the CDS-AQ relationship, we add to our main 
regression model two variables: a main effect of restatements (RESTATE) and an interaction term 
between AQ and restatements (AQ x RESTATE). Ex ante, and consistent with Du (2017), we 
predict a positive coefficient on the restatement dichotomous variable, because observations with 
restatements, which overwhelming reduce net income (see footnote 14) and may indicate fraud, 
generally increase the risk of failing to meet interest and principal payments. We predict a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term. This is because restatements are a clear indicator of financial 
reporting problems, often affecting net income. If the net income figure is suspect lower weight 
should accordingly be placed on a less-clear (relative to a restatement event) indicator of the 
quality of those earnings. 
As tabulated below in Column C of Table 8, our findings are generally in line with 
expectations, although the coefficient estimates are not significantly different than zero. The 
coefficient on RESTATE is positive and nearly significant at the ten percent level (coefficient 
estimate = 0.104, p = 0.12), while the interaction term AQ x RESTATE is negative but not 
significant (coefficient estimate = -1.070, p = 0.50).31 
Finally, in our primary analysis we follow prior research (Callen et al. 2009; Shivakumar 
et al. 2011) and examine the impact of AQ and its components on five-year CDS contracts. To test 
the sensitivity of our results to different maturities, we repeat our primary analysis of the impact 
of accruals quality on CDS spreads of other maturities. Our results for AQ and RANK_AQ hold 
                                                     
31 An absence of significant results may be intuitive as well if restatements are more-likely-than-not to identify accruals 
risk due to discretionary accruals rather than due to innate accruals. The lack of significant results in the interaction 
term with restatements may support our overall finding that innate accruals are more important than discretionary 
accruals as a factor in the pricing of credit spreads. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this interpretation. 
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when we use one-, three-, seven-, and ten-year maturity contracts. Also consistent with Duffie and 
Lando (2001) and Yu (2005), the effect of accruals quality on credit spreads tends to diminish as 
maturity length increases as evidenced by declining coefficient magnitudes.32 When we split total 
accruals quality into its innate and discretionary components in Column C of Table 9, INNATE 
continues to drive our main findings. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
5.3. Robustness tests 
We perform additional untabulated tests regarding the construction of our dependent 
variable. Our primary results are robust to alternatively using the CDS spread on: (1) the filing 
date of 10-K as listed on the Security and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR website, both in OLS 
and fixed effects models, and (2) to using the CDS spread on the last day of the third month 
following the filing rather than the average of the daily spread over the course of that month, again 
in both OLS and fixed effects models. Further, our results continue to hold when we control for 
two measures of a firm’s information environment: institutional ownership (Jennings et al., 2002) 
and analyst forecast dispersion (Barron et al., 1998).33 
Additionally, we confirm the robustness of our results to the inclusion of multiple 
additional independent variables. Our results are unaffected by the inclusion of Altman’s (1968) 
Z-score, expected default frequency calculated from the KMV-Merton model (Merton, 1974; 
Bharath and Shumway, 2008), and concurrent one-month equity returns (untabulated).   
                                                     
32 Our inferences do not change if we instead run a single regression for all maturities and use maturity dichotomous 
variables and their interactions with AQ (untabulated) to evaluate the robustness of our findings. 
33 Specifically, we obtain institutional ownership data from Thomson and define institutional ownership as the fraction 
of shares owned by institutional investors divided by total shares outstanding. We obtain analyst forecast information 
from I/B/E/S and calculation dispersion as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts.  
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Lastly, we re-run all results with S&P’s long-term (LTCR) and short-term credit ratings 
(STCR) instead of the implied credit rating (IR) provided by Markit. STCR tends to be available 
for the larger firms in the sample (the mean market value of firms with STCR is $32.5 billion versus 
$8.2 billion for those without, untabulated). While using STCR results in a sample size that is 
reduced by roughly half (2,028 observations versus 4,016), all of our results hold in this alternative, 
reduced sample (untabulated).34 
 
5.3. Operating Characteristics Critique 
Liu and Wysocki (2007) suggest that the observed relation between AQ and the cost of debt 
as identified by Francis et al. (2005) is merely an artifact of the association between AQ and 
operating characteristics, namely variation in stock returns and cash flows. In contrast to Francis 
et al. (2005), our base model controls for the standard deviation of returns. In an effort to fully test 
the robustness of our results to this concern we repeat our OLS and fixed effects specifications of 
Equation (2) and include the standard deviation of firm cash flows over the preceding ten years. 
Results (untabulated) indicate that AQ remains positive and significant in both OLS (coefficient 
estimate = 2.666, p < 0.01) and fixed effects (coefficient estimate = 3.992, p < 0.01) specifications 
while controlling for operating characteristics identified by Liu and Wysocki (2007).35  
 
6. Conclusion 
 This study examines the relationship between accounting earnings and credit spreads. We 
find that the level of accruals quality as measured by the McNichols (2002) model is significantly 
related to CDS spreads. Poorer accruals quality, indicated by a larger standard deviation of the 
                                                     
34 In untabulated analyses we replace IR with actual long-term credit ratings from Standard and Poor’s (S&P). Our 
results are unaffected by this alternative choice of credit rating measure.  
35 Intuitively, the estimated coefficient on the standard deviation of cash flows variable is positive and significant in 
both OLS and fixed effects model specifications.  
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residual from the accruals quality model, is associated with higher CDS spreads. Further, a parsing 
of overall accruals quality into its innate and discretionary components following Francis et al.  
(2005) reveals that it is innate accruals quality which largely drives our primary findings. These 
results are robust to the usage of fixed effects and change models. We also find that accruals quality 
moderates the negative relationship between earnings and CDS spreads.  
 We contribute to the emerging literature on the impact of information risk on credit spreads 
by showing that the credit default swap market prices information risk in accounting earnings. 
Greater uncertainty about the realization of accruals into cash flows results in market participants 
charging higher insurance premiums to protection buyers. This finding aligns with most existing 
research regarding the effects of accruals quality on the cost of equity and debt in other markets 
(e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Krishnan et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2009; Jorion et al., 2009; Kim and Qi, 
2010; Ogneva, 2012). We also extend Callen et al. (2009) by showing the CDS market is sensitive 
not only to the level, but also to the quality, of reported earnings. Our findings suggest a moderating 
role for accruals quality in the relationship between earnings and CDS spreads whereby higher 
levels of information risk in earnings diminishes earnings’ informativeness to the CDS market. 
This is consistent with findings regarding information precision and pricing from other markets 
(e.g., Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988; Hautsch and Hess, 2007).  
  Future research may wish to examine whether the CDS market is sensitive to other 
measures of information risk aside from that contained in earnings. It would also be interesting to 
investigate the impact of the quality of accounting data other than earnings which may convey firm 
information risk. Regarding accruals quality specifically, it may additionally be fruitful to examine 
how the information risk in earnings affects short and long-window market reactions to earnings. 
 
 
 28  
 
 
Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
AQ   Accruals quality as measured by the standard 
deviation of the residual from the McNichols (2002) 
model with larger values corresponding to poorer 
accruals quality. 
ΔAQ Change in accruals quality between years t-1 and t. 
AT  Log of total assets. 
ΔCA  Change in current assets between years t-1 and t. 
ΔCash       Change in cash between years t-1 and t. 
CDS  Natural log of the average daily CDS spread three 
months after earnings announcement.  
CFO  Cash flow from operations, defined as NIBE – TA. 
σ(CFO)  Standard deviation of cash flow from operations over 
period t-9 through t. 
ΔCL       Change in current liabilities between years t-1 and t. 
DISCRET      Discretionary portion of accruals quality.  
DEPN       Depreciation and amortization expense in year t. 
EX_YIELD Residual obtained by regressing bond spreads on 
rating, duration, maturity, issuing size, and coupon 
rates, averaged across all issuances for a given firm 
for the month three months following the reporting 
date. 
GFC A dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if an 
observation is between 9/2007 and 6/2009.  
INNATE     Innate portion of accruals quality.  
IR  The firm’s implied credit rating as provided by 
Markit, coded with a larger value corresponding to 
greater creditworthiness. 
ΔIR Change in implied rating between years t-1 and t.  
LEV  Leverage, computed as total debt scaled by total 
assets. 
ΔLEV Change in leverage between years t-1 and t. 
LOWRATED A dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 if an 
observation has an S&P long-term credit ratings of 
BBB or below, 0 otherwise.  
LTCR  S&P long-term credit rating, coded with larger 
values corresponding to greater creditworthiness. 
NegEarn  Number of years out of the past ten that a firm 
reported net income before extraordinary items < 0. 
NIBE  Net income before extraordinary items. 
OperCycle  Operating cycle, defined as the log of the sum of 
days’ inventory and days’ accounts receivable. 
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POOR_AQ A dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 if an 
observation is in the poorest ten percent of all AQ 
observations, 0 otherwise. 
PPE  Gross value of property, plant, and equipment. 
RANK_AQ The decile-ranked form of AQ.  
Raw Size      Market value of equity in billions of dollars. 
Raw CDS Spread  Average daily five-year CDS spreads (in basis 
points) for the month three months following the 
reporting date. 
Raw Bond Spread Difference between the bond yield of an issue and the 
yield of a comparable maturity treasury bond, 
averaged across outstanding issuances for a given 
firm for the month three months following the 
reporting date.  
 ΔRev  Change in revenues between years t-1 and t. 
RESTATE A dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 (0 
otherwise) if earnings are restated.   
ROA  Return on assets, computed as income before 
extraordinary items divided by average total assets. 
ΔROA Change in return on assets between years t-1 and t. 
 σ(Sales)  Standard deviation of sales over the period t-9 
through t. 
SD_RET  Standard deviation of monthly returns during the 
firm’s current fiscal year. 
ΔSD_RET Change in standard deviation of monthly returns 
between years t-1 and t. 
SIZE       Natural log of the market value of equity. 
ΔSIZE Change in the natural log of the market value of 
equity between years t-1 and t.  
SPOT       One-year Treasury bill rate. 
ΔSPOT Change in the one-year Treasury bill rate between 
years t-1 and t. 
STCR  S&P short-term credit rating, coded with larger 
values corresponding to greater creditworthiness. 
STDEBT Short-term debt. 
ΔSTDEBT  Change in short-term debt between years t-1 and t. 
TA  Total accruals = ΔCA – ΔCL - ΔCash + ΔSTDEBT – 
DEPN. 
TCA  Total current accruals for firm, ΔCA – ΔCL – ΔCash 
+ ΔSTDEBT in year t.  
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Table 1 
Sample by Year 
Year Firm-Year Observations 
2001 65 
2002 167 
2003 229 
2004 319 
2005 381 
2006 391 
2007 394 
2008 403 
2009 375 
2010 349 
2011 342 
2012 338 
2013 263 
Total 4,016 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Sample Period 2001 - 2013 
 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Raw CDS Spread 4,016 187.58 295.01 10.55 44.00 88.02 199.92 2,180.95 
Raw Bond Spread 2,984 2.311 2.249 -3.258 1.052 1.713 3.090 12.871 
CDS 4,016 3.638 1.346 1.046 2.665 3.530 4.455 7.505 
EX_YIELD 2,984 -0.173 1.279 -2.715 -1.145 -0.191 0.831 2.483 
AQ 4,016 0.027 0.021 0.002 0.013 0.021 0.035 0.126 
INNATE 4,016 0.028 0.011 0.006 0.020 0.026 0.033 0.070 
DISCRET 4,016 -0.001 0.019 -0.040 -0.011 -0.003 0.007 0.076 
ROA 4,016 0.047 0.068 -0.294 0.021 0.047 0.081 0.246 
LEV 4,016 0.650 0.190 0.169 0.530 0.635 0.747 1.557 
SD_RET 4,016 0.091 0.058 0.028 0.053 0.076 0.110 0.371 
SPOT 4,016 1.928 1.758 0.120 0.320 1.300 3.030 5.060 
Raw Size 4,016 20.477 39.079 0.001 3.053 7.952 18.993 504.240 
SIZE 4,016 22.761 1.428 16.939 21.839 22.797 23.667 25.830 
IR 4,016 6.955 1.448 4.000 6.000 7.000 8.000 9.000 
STCR 2,028 8.249 1.108 2.000 8.000 8.000 9.000 10.000 
Raw CDS Spread is the average daily five-year CDS spreads (in basis points) for the month three months following the reporting 
date. Raw Bond Spread is the difference between the bond yield of an issue and the yield of a comparable maturity treasury bond, 
averaged across outstanding issuances for a given firm for the month three months following the reporting date. CDS is the natural 
log of the raw spread. EX_YIELD is the residual obtained by regressing bond spreads on rating, duration, maturity, issuing size, and 
coupon rates, averaged across all issuances for a given firm for the month three months following the reporting date. AQ is accruals 
quality as measured by the standard deviation of the residual from the McNichols (2002) model. INNATE is the innate portion of 
accruals quality. DISCRET is the discretionary portion of accruals quality. ROA is return on assets, computed as income before 
extraordinary items divided by average total assets. LEV is leverage, computed as total debt scaled by total assets. SD_RET is the 
standard deviation of monthly returns during the firm’s current fiscal year. SPOT is the one-year Treasury bill rate. Raw Size is the 
market value of equity in billions. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity. IR is the firm’s implied credit rating as 
provided by Markit, coded with a larger value corresponding to greater creditworthiness. STCR is the firm’s Sand P short-term 
credit rating, coded with larger values corresponding to greater creditworthiness. 
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Table 3 
Regression Results: OLS Model of Equation (2)  
Dependent Variable: EX_YIELD 
Column A B C 
  Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  5.239 
(14.19) 
*** 5.192 
(14.23) 
*** 5.247 
(14.33) 
*** 
AQ  1.064 
(1.48) 
     
RANK_AQ    0.009 
(1.72) 
*   
INNATE      0.784 
(0.57) 
 
DISCRET      1.124 
(1.46) 
 
ROA  1.237 
(5.12) 
*** 1.223 
(5.07) 
*** 1.235 
(5.09) 
*** 
LEV  -0.077 
(-0.83) 
 -0.069 
(-0.76) 
 -0.077 
(-0.83) 
 
SD_RET  -0.064 
(-0.18) 
 -0.077 
(-0.22) 
 -0.049 
(-0.14) 
 
SPOT  -0.439 
(-9.62) 
*** -0.439 
(-9.61) 
*** -0.440 
(-9.62) 
*** 
SIZE  -0.156 
(-9.54) 
*** -0.155 
(-9.51) 
*** -0.157 
(-9.57) 
*** 
IR  -0.027 
(-1.92) 
* -0.027 
(-1.89) 
* -0.027 
(-1.92) 
* 
Year Fixed Effects?  Included  Included  Included  
   
N  2,984  2,984  2,984  
Adj. R2  82.76%  82.77%  82.75%  
 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect clustering at the firm level. EX_YIELD is the residual obtained 
by regressing bond spreads on rating, duration, maturity, issuing size, and coupon rates, averaged across all 
issuances for a given firm for the month three months following the reporting date. (Lin et al., 2011) for the month 
three months following the report date. AQ is accruals quality as measured by the standard deviation of the residual 
from the McNichols (2002) model. RANK_AQ is the decile-ranked form of AQ. INNATE is the innate portion of 
accruals quality. DISCRET is the discretionary portion of accruals quality. ROA is return on assets, computed as 
income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets. LEV is leverage, computed as total debt scaled 
by total assets. SD_RET is the standard deviation of monthly returns during the firm’s current fiscal year. SPOT is 
the one-year Treasury bill rate. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity. IR is the firm’s implied credit 
rating as provided by Markit, coded with larger values corresponding to greater creditworthiness. 
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
Pearson (Above Diagonal) and Spearman (Below Diagonal) 
 CDS AQ INNATE DISCRET ROA LEV SD_RET SPOT SIZE IR 
CDS  0.219 
(<.0001) 
0.280 
(<.0001) 
0.078 
(<.0001) 
-0.451 
(<.0001) 
0.353 
(<.0001) 
0.636 
(<.0001) 
-0.341 
(<.0001) 
-0.557 
(<.0001) 
-0.568 
(<.0001) 
AQ 0.229 
(<.0001) 
 0.470 
(<.0001) 
0.842 
(<.0001) 
-0.107 
(0.0021) 
-0.018 
(0.2557) 
0.277 
(<.0001) 
0.009 
(0.5709) 
-0.157 
(<.0001) 
-0.201 
(<.0001) 
INNATE 0.300 
(<.0001) 
0.463 
(<.0001) 
 -0.074 
(0.0014) 
-0.154 
(<.0001) 
0.046 
(0.0036) 
0.344 
(<.0001) 
-0.039 
(0.0125) 
-0.199 
(<.0001) 
-0.197 
(<.0001) 
DISCRET 0.047 
(0.0030) 
0.737 
(<.0001) 
-0.165 
(<.0001) 
 -0.020 
(0.2011) 
-0.045 
(0.0045) 
0.104 
(<.0001) 
-0.016 
(0.3220) 
-0.053 
(0.0007) 
-0.102 
(<.0001) 
ROA -0.486 
(<.0001) 
-0.038 
(0.0161) 
-0.117 
(<.0001) 
0.036 
(0.0234) 
 -0.326 
(<.0001) 
-0.380 
(<.0001) 
0.052 
(0.0010) 
0.451 
(<.0001) 
0.378 
(<.0001) 
LEV 0.293 
(<.0001) 
-0.109 
(<.0001) 
-0.049 
(0.0018) 
-0.073 
(<.0001) 
-0.356 
(<.0001) 
 0.238 
(<.0001) 
-0.058 
(0.0003) 
-0.346 
(<.0001) 
-0.332 
(<.0001) 
SD_RET 0.602 
(<.0001) 
0.335 
(<.0001) 
0.395 
(<.0001) 
0.089 
(<.0001) 
-0.297 
(<.0001) 
0.084 
(<.0001) 
 -0.129 
(<.0001) 
-0.473 
(<.0001) 
-0.433 
(<.0001) 
SPOT -0.257 
(<.0001) 
-0.001 
(0.9402) 
0.046 
(0.0033) 
-0.034 
(0.0289) 
0.042 
(0.0084) 
-0.050 
(0.0014) 
-0.056 
(0.0004) 
 -0.031 
(0.0467) 
0.005 
(0.7690) 
SIZE -0.536 
(<.0001) 
-0.180 
(<.0001) 
-0.295 
(<.0001) 
0.0011 
(0.9436) 
0.460 
(<.0001) 
-0.284 
(<.0001) 
-0.432 
(<.0001) 
-0.065 
(<.0001) 
 0.598 
(<.0001) 
IR -0.546 
(<.0001) 
-0.207 
(<.0001) 
-0.223 
(<.0001) 
-0.066 
(<.0001) 
0.403 
(<.0001) 
-0.274 
(<.0001) 
-0.424 
(<.0001) 
0.019 
(0.2232) 
0.597 
(<.0001)  
Variable definitions provided in Table 2 and the Appendix. 
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Table 5 
Regression Results: OLS Model of Equation (2) 
Dependent Variable: CDS 
Column A B C 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  8.438 
(19.50) 
*** 8.341 
(19.06) 
*** 8.282 
(19.61) 
*** 
AQ + 3.114 
(3.58) 
***     
RANK_AQ +   0.024 
(3.56) 
***   
INNATE +     10.523 
(5.74) 
*** 
DISCRET +     1.277 
(1.36) 
 
ROA - -1.873 
(-5.96) 
*** -1.905 
(-6.01) 
*** -1.831 
(-5.80) 
*** 
LEV + 0.572 
(4.76) 
*** 0.588 
(4.86) 
*** 0.577 
(4.74) 
*** 
SD_RET + 5.226 
(13.04) 
*** 5.224 
(13.08) 
*** 4.761 
(11.85) 
*** 
SPOT - -0.341 
(-7.89) 
*** -0.340 
(-7.90) 
*** -0.340 
(-7.88) 
*** 
SIZE - -0.177 
(-8.63) 
*** -0.175 
(-8.45) 
*** -0.177 
(-8.82) 
*** 
IR - -0.276 
(-12.41) 
*** -0.276 
(-12.43) 
*** -0.276 
(-12.66) 
*** 
Year Fixed Effects?  Included  Included  Included  
   
N  4,016  4,016  4,016  
Adj. R2  70.40%  70.39%  70.83%  
 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect clustering at the firm level. CDS is the natural log of the 
average daily five-year CDS spreads (in basis points) for the month three months following the report date. AQ is 
accruals quality as measured by the standard deviation of the residual from the McNichols (2002) model. 
RANK_AQ is the decile-ranked form of AQ. INNATE is the innate portion of accruals quality. DISCRET is the 
discretionary portion of accruals quality. ROA is return on assets, computed as income before extraordinary items 
divided by average total assets. LEV is leverage, computed as total debt scaled by total assets. SD_RET is the 
standard deviation of monthly returns during the firm’s current fiscal year. SPOT is the one-year Treasury bill rate. 
SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity. IR is the firm’s implied credit rating as provided by Markit, 
coded with larger values corresponding to greater creditworthiness. 
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Table 6 
Regression Results: Fixed Effects and Changes Models of Equation (2) 
Panel A: Firm Fixed Effects Panel B: Change in CDS Spread 
Dependent Variable: 
CDS  
Dependent Variable: 
ΔCDS  
    
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  8.093 
(9.94) 
*** Intercept  -0.278 
(12.66) 
*** 
AQ + 4.168 
(5.10) 
*** ΔAQ + 3.558 
(3.14) 
*** 
ROA - -1.040 
(-4.69) 
*** ΔROA - -0.267 
(-1.07) 
 
LEV + 0.532 
(3.67) 
*** ΔLEV + 0.608 
(3.51) 
*** 
SD_RET + 3.680 
(12.34) 
*** ΔSD_RET + 1.535 
(5.68) 
*** 
SPOT - -0.390 
(-11.12) 
*** ΔSPOT - -0.176 
(-6.01) 
*** 
SIZE - -0.216 
(-8.20) 
*** ΔSIZE - -0.017 
(-0.49) 
 
IR - -0.105 
(-1.67) 
* ΔIR - 0.103 
(0.94) 
 
Year Fixed 
Effects? 
 Included  Year Fixed 
Effects? 
 Included  
  
N 3,946  N 3,437  
R2 82.09%  Adj. R2 39.59%  
 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Firm fixed effects coefficients omitted for brevity in Panel A. CDS is the natural log 
of the average daily five-year CDS spreads (in basis points) for the month three months following the report date. 
AQ is accruals quality as measured by the standard deviation of the residual from the McNichols (2002) model. 
ROA is return on assets, computed as income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets. LEV is 
leverage, computed as total debt scaled by total assets. SD_RET is the standard deviation of daily returns during 
the firm’s current fiscal year. SPOT is the one-year Treasury bill rate. SIZE is the natural log of the market value 
of equity. IR is the firm’s implied credit rating as provided by Markit, coded with larger values corresponding to 
greater creditworthiness.  
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Table 7 
Regression Results 
OLS Model of Equations (5a and 5b)  
Dependent Variable: CDS 
Column A  
(Model 5a) 
B  
(Model 5b) 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
 
Intercept  8.340 
(19.20) 
*** 8.514 
(19.85) 
***   
ROA - -3.277 
(-5.80) 
*** -2.154 
(-5.82) 
***   
ROA x AQ + 31.620 
(3.34) 
***     
AQ + 2.032 
(2.16) 
**     
ROA x POOR_AQ +   1.342 
(1.96) 
**   
POOR_AQ +   0.063 
(0.86) 
   
LEV + 0.574 
(4.81) 
*** 0.528 
(4.44) 
***   
SD_RET + 5.275 
(13.25) 
*** 5.491 
(13.95) 
***   
SPOT - -0.345 
(-8.02) 
*** -0.337 
(-7.79) 
***   
SIZE - -0.172 
(-8.36) 
*** -0.176 
(-8.62) 
***   
IR - -0.270 
(-12.08) 
*** -0.278 
(-12.49) 
***   
Year Fixed Effects?  Included  Included    
   
N  4,016  4,016    
Adj. R2  70.55%  70.28%    
 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect clustering at the firm level. CDS is the natural log of the 
average daily five-year CDS spreads (in basis points) for the month 3 months following the reporting date. ROA 
is return on assets, computed as income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets. AQ is accruals 
quality as measured by the standard deviation of the residual from the McNichols (2002) model. POOR_AQ is a 
dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the accruals quality as previously measured is in the poorest 10% 
of all observations. LEV is leverage, computed as total debt scaled by total assets. SD_RET is the standard deviation 
of daily returns during the firm’s current fiscal year. SPOT is the one-year Treasury bill rate. SIZE is the natural 
log of the market value of equity. IR is the firm’s implied credit rating as provided by Markit, coded with larger 
values corresponding to greater creditworthiness. 
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Table 8 
Regression Results 
OLS Model of Equation (2) with time period and ratings interactions  
Dependent Variable: CDS 
Column A B C 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  9.039 
(21.10) 
*** 7.289 
(16.49) 
*** 8.092 
(19.05) 
*** 
AQ + 3.598 
(3.92) 
*** 3.217 
(2.30) 
** 3.381 
(3.51) 
*** 
AQ x GFC ? -2.857 
(-1.77) 
*     
GFC + 0.023 
(0.30) 
     
AQ x LOWRATED ?   -0.313 
(-0.18) 
   
LOWRATED +   0.426 
(7.29) 
***   
AQ x RESTATE -     -1.070 
(-0.67) 
 
RESTATE +     0.104 
(1.58) 
 
ROA - -1.767 
(-5.68) 
*** -1.427 
(-4.86) 
*** -2.110 
(-6.67) 
*** 
LEV + 0.532 
(4.47) 
*** 0.556 
(4.98) 
*** 0.576 
(4.82) 
*** 
SD_RET + 7.077 
(19.76) 
*** 7.288 
(21.33) 
*** 5.383 
(13.44) 
*** 
SPOT - -0.236 
(-15.72) 
*** -0.243 
(-26.79) 
*** -0.340 
(-7.54) 
*** 
SIZE - -0.188 
(-9.38) 
*** -0.137 
(-7.12) 
*** -0.161 
(-7.91) 
*** 
IR - -0.241 
(-11.48) 
*** -0.209 
(-10.17) 
*** -0.280 
(-12.55) 
*** 
Year Fixed Effects?  Included  Included  Included  
        
N  4,016  4,016  3,757  
Adj. R2  66.92%  68.17%  71.30%  
 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect clustering at the firm level. CDS is the natural log of the average 
daily five-year CDS spreads (in basis points) for the month three months following the report date. AQ is accruals 
quality as measured by the standard deviation of the residual from the McNichols (2002) model. GFC is a dichotomous 
variable which takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) for observations between 9/07 and 6/09. LOWRATED is a dichotomous 
variable which takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if an observation carries an S&P long-term rating of BBB or lower. 
RESTATE is a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if earnings are restated.  ROA is return on 
assets, computed as income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets. LEV is leverage, computed as 
total debt scaled by total assets. SD_RET is the standard deviation of monthly returns during the firm’s current fiscal 
year. SPOT is the one-year Treasury bill rate. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity. IR is the firm’s 
implied credit rating as provided by Markit, coded with larger values corresponding to greater creditworthiness. 
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Table 9 
Regression Results 
Test of Alternative Maturities 
Column  A B C 
Independent Variable:  AQ RANK_AQ INNATE DISCRET 
 
Dependent Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
1-Year CDS + 2.987 
(3.91) 
*** 0.023 
(3.86) 
*** 9.755 
(5.89) 
*** 1.285 
(1.53) 
 
3-Year CDS + 2.759 
(3.89) 
*** 0.021 
(3.82) 
*** 8.870 
(5.74) 
*** 1.198 
(1.52) 
 
7-Year CDS + 2.399 
(3.62) 
*** 0.018 
(3.50) 
*** 8.254 
(5.69) 
*** 0.901 
(1.22) 
 
10-Year CDS + 1.634 
(2.54) 
** 0.010 
(2.00) 
** 6.752 
(5.01) 
*** 0.360 
(0.50) 
 
 
The table above reflects the results of estimating Models 2 and 4 across various maturities. All controls from Models 2 and 4 are 
included but omitted for concision. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect 
clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
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This figure plots the mean CDS spread (in raw basis points) by accruals quality quantile, where accruals quality is 
measured as the standard deviation of the residual from the McNichols (2002) model. 
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Figure 1: Mean CDS Spread by AQ Quintile
